Bucknell University

Bucknell Digital Commons
Faculty Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

Summer 1999

Critical Intercultural Dialogue
Michael James
Bucknell University, mjames@bucknell.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.bucknell.edu/fac_journ
Part of the Political Theory Commons

Recommended Citation
James, Michael. "Critical Intercultural Dialogue." (1999) : 587-607.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Bucknell Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Bucknell Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact dcadmin@bucknell.edu.

Critical Intercultural Dialogue
Author(s): Michael Rabinder James
Source: Polity, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Summer, 1999), pp. 587-607
Published by: Palgrave Macmillan Journals
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3235237
Accessed: 07-09-2016 16:38 UTC
REFERENCES
Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3235237?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents
You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted
digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about
JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms

Palgrave Macmillan Journals is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Polity

This content downloaded from 134.82.68.137 on Wed, 07 Sep 2016 16:38:09 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Critical Intercultural Dialogue*
Michael Rabinder James
Bucknell University

Cultural pluralism assumes the persistence of inter-group conflicts and
poses the question of how members of multiethnic liberal democracies
should address disagreements stemming from divergent cultural values.
Allowing groups greater cultural autonomy resolves some problems, but
does not address those that arise when different cultural values suggest
divergent answers to questions of common concern. These can be addressed
through developing practices of critical intercultural dialogue that will provide a basis for mutual understanding of group values and valid intercultural criticism. Such critical intercultural dialogue is based on three criteria: the priority of understanding the other's values to criticism of them, the
achievement offair conditions of discussion, and the fostering of mutual
openness and trust. This article identifies the difficulties in the way of
attaining each of these criteria, drawing examples from recent discussions
between members of Native American and other American communities.

Michael Rabinder James is an Assistant Professor in the Department of
Political Science, Bucknell University, Lewisburg, PA 17837. He received
his Ph.D. from Duke University in 1996 upon completing a dissertation
titled "Dialogical Pluralism: Cultural Diversity, Normative Universality,

and Critical Hermeneutics." His article "Tribal Sovereignty and the
Intercultural Public Sphere" will be published in Philosophy and Social
Criticism.

Cultural pluralism is increasingly central to contemporary democratic theory
and practice. The need to accommodate diverse cultural groups confronts not

only emerging democracies in the developing world and Eastern Europe but
also established democracies like Canada, the United States, Germany, and
France. In some instances, accommodating cultural groups involves struggles to
redistribute resources and opportunities to victims of past or present injustice,
as with affirmative action and race-conscious districting in the United States. In
*I thank Jeff Corntassel and Timothy Luke for comments on earlier drafts of this article and

Romand Coles, Michael Gillespie, Thomas A. Spragens, Nicole Tronzano Speletic, and Stephen
K. White for illuminating discussions of these questions.
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588 Critical Intercultural Dialogue

other instances, cultural pluralism also reflects the desire of cultural groups to
maintain distinct identities amidst the pressures of assimilation. While the latter
type of struggle can involve past or present oppression, it may also raise inter-

cultural value conflicts. Severe forms of value conflict have arisen regarding
issues of gender equality' and religious toleration.2 More moderate value conflicts involve the proper use of natural resources,3 legitimate forms of self-government,4 and proper forms of punishment for criminal offenses.5

Because cultural pluralism assumes the persistence of inter-group differences, it poses the question of how members of liberal-democratic societies
should address divergent cultural values. For the most part, political theorists
addressing issues of cultural pluralism have advocated measures such as group
rights and self-government as necessary both to protect threatened minority
cultures and to realize egalitarian justice within a culturally plural, liberal-dem-

ocratic society.6 However, controversies involving intercultural value conflicts

indicate the insufficiency of such measures. Most troubling are severe value
conflicts, which apparently require either tolerating illiberal cultural practices

1. For instance, the Supreme Court granted ultimate jurisdiction over Native civil cases to
tribal courts, thereby upholding a Santa Clara ordinance granting member status to the children
of men who married outside of the tribe while excluding the children of women who did so. Santa

Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 98 US 1670 (1978). See also Vine Deloria Jr. and Clifford M. Lytle,
American Indians, American Justice (Austin, TX: The University of Texas Press, 1983), 133-36.

2. For example, Delfino Concha, a Protestant member of the quasi-Catholic, quasi-theocratic Taos Pueblo, lost access to community-owned farming machinery and water resources
because he refused to engage in communal, religious services. Hearings before the Subcommit-

tee on Constitutional Rights of Indians, the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States
Senate, Amendments to the Indian Bill of Rights. First Session (April 11, 1969) (Washington, DC:

Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 59-60. A similar situation came before the Canadian
Supreme Court in Thomas v. Norris, where the Salish tribal council punished a member for failing to participate in a Spirit Dance. See James Tully, Strange Multiplicity (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1995), 172.
3. Thomas Berger, A Long and Terrible Shadow: White Values, Native Rights in the Americas, 1492-1992 (Seattle, WA: The University of Washington Press, 1991), 101-103.
4. See Amendments to the Indian Bill of Rights, 7-11 and below.

5. See Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
6. For Iris Young, indigenous self-government counters the invidious forms of oppression
suffered by marginal groups, like Native Americans, whose cultural identities differ from the
Western, white male ideal. Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-

versity Press, 1990), 37-38. For James Tully, tribal self-government helps to realize the three
"conventions" for a just accommodation of distinct cultures: the mutual recognition of a cultural
group's sovereignty, the consent of each cultural group to a given form of rule, and the preservation of continuity with a cultural group's past and future traditions. Strange Multiplicity, 116-23.

For Will Kymlicka, tribal sovereignty assists individuals within disadvantaged "national minorities" to make autonomous life choices from among an array of culturally meaningful life plans.

Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 82-84 and 108-15; Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 164-66 and 187-94.
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or imposing liberal norms upon already subordinate groups. However, even
moderate intercultural value conflicts are not completely resolved through
measures providing greater cultural autonomy. Members of non-protected
communities may only reluctantly comply with what they perceive as special
privileges granted to other groups. Conversely, protected communities may
lack opportunities to criticize values and practices of the majority culture. In
general, minority group rights and self-government do not encourage cultural
communities to address intercultural value conflicts in a manner that enables

intercultural understanding. As a result the groups involved are unlikely to
respect each other, let alone learn from each other in mutually beneficial ways.

Here, I explore a more robust response to the problem of intercultural
value conflict. I suggest that members of conflicting cultures should practice
critical intercultural dialogue, whereby they try first to understand and only
then to criticize cultural practices they find offensive. In turn, such under-

standing and criticism should occur through actual intercultural dialogues
which take place under fair conditions. While several theorists implicitly
assume the value of this orientation,7 it has yet to be illuminated in light of its

theoretical and practical limitations. For instance, understanding another's
perspective, while not easy in any circumstance, is especially difficult when
there are wide gaps in culture, experience, and history. Furthermore, securing
fair conditions acceptable to members of different cultures will also be difficult, since forms of power may permeate intercultural dialogue itself.

These limitations can significantly constrain the possibility of intercultural criticism. But they need not entirely preclude it, if we transform its
scope, manner, and aims and make sure that all interpretations of fair conditions remain open to revision. In making this moderate defense of critical
intercultural dialogue, I do not attempt to resolve specific intercultural value
conflicts, since any dialogical approach should leave such resolutions up to
the participants themselves. Nor does critical intercultural dialogue exhaust
all possible theoretical and practical responses to the problem of intercultural
value conflict. However, by both articulating the central components of critical intercultural dialogue and examining the limitations, possibilities, and
conditions facing it, I seek to clarify what must be kept in mind by members
of conflicting cultures who wish to engage each other in a mutually educative
and critical manner. I do so first by outlining three central criteria for critical
intercultural dialogue. I then clarify how understanding different cultural per-

spectives faces important empirical and ontological limitations, which in turn
affect the scope, manner, and goals of intercultural criticism. Subsequently, I
examine the conditions necessary for critical intercultural dialogue to proceed

7. E.g., Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 168-71; Tully, Strange Multiplicity, 116.
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590 Critical Intercultural Dialogue

fairly. Finally, I illuminate the practice of critical intercultural dialogue
through cases involving certain Native American peoples.

I. Critical Intercultural Dialogue: Central Criteria
Critical intercultural dialogue is possible only if the participants satisfy three
criteria: they must adopt an attitude of openness towards each other's cultural

perspectives; they must come to understand each other's perspectives; and
they must communicate under conditions which they mutually can accept as
fair. Only when these criteria are satisfied can members of one culture criticize the practices of another.
The attitude of openness suggests that participants must believe that each

other's cultural perspectives or worldviews are, in principle, capable of being
understood. Participants cannot assume that their worldviews constitute her-

metically-sealed chambers of meaning: rather, they must assume that their
worldviews are more like distant but open horizons, understandable through
vigorous interpretive effort.8 This attitude presupposes a sufficient level of

trust among participants. They must trust each other to engage in dialogue
rather than coercion or manipulation, and they must trust that the dialogue
itself will be fair and open-minded, not a volley of stereotypes. In this way,
openness and trust are prior to but necessary for intercultural dialogue. The

history of oppression experienced by many minority cultural groups may
mean that trust and openness are not forthcoming. But without them, intercultural dialogue, critical or otherwise, is impossible.
The criterion of intercultural understanding suggests that one cannot validly
criticize cultural practices or beliefs until one understands them. It also requires

that intercultural understanding develop through actual dialogical encounters,

not through empathy-whereby one vicariously experiences the feelings,
thoughts, and experiences of the other-or transposition-whereby one claims
to know the other's intentions and motives.9 Both empathy and transposition
risk encouraging the imaginative projection of one's own prior beliefs, fantasies, and prejudices about the other onto the other. In a brilliant illustration of
this danger, Iris Young relates how able-bodied people polled in Oregon felt that

being disabled was worse than death. Disabled people did not agree. Young concludes that the projection of one's prior prejudices about the other fundamen-

tally closes off any genuine dialogue, through which participants could truly
learn each other's perspectives.10 Dialogical understanding demands that mem8. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2d. rev. ed., trans. Donald Marshall and Joel
Weinsheimer (New York: Crossroad Publishing Co., 1990), 302-06.
9. I translate as "transposition" Gadamer's idea of Versetzen. See Truth and Method, 304.

10. Iris Marion Young, "Asymmetrical Reciprocity: On Moral Respect, Wonder, and
Enlarged Thought," Constellations 3, (1997): 343-44.
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bers of different cultures actively engage each other in real dialogue, listen to
what the other says, and reach partial agreements about the meaning of the per-

spectives communicated." In this way, dialogical understanding occurs gradually, in piecemeal and incremental steps based on mutual agreement.
Finally, dialogue must proceed under conditions that all parties involved can
accept as fair. Thus, fair conditions must remain revisable as the participants and

circumstances change. Here, I will provisionally suggest two conditions that
may apply to intercultural dialogue.12 First, participants within intercultural dia-

logue should not exercise power over each other. Power may come in the form
of physical coercion, economic threats, or modes of speaking which effectively

silence one's partner. Second, conditions should allow for thematically uncon-

strained dialogue. Participants cannot, prior to dialogue, preclude certain
themes, issues, or topics from discussion. In the context of intercultural communication, this means that a cultural group cannot unilaterally remove all or

parts of its worldview from discussion. Topics can be taken off the agenda
within intercultural dialogue, but only when agreed upon by all parties. Note
how the preclusion of thematic constraints leads back to the first criterion of
openness and trust. Intercultural dialogue, critical or not, cannot serve as a
means for addressing cultural conflicts unless participants are open to allowing
others to understand their perspectives. This, in turn, precludes thematically
constraining dialogue in order to keep parts of one's worldview off the agenda.
The three criteria of critical intercultural dialogue as a whole, and the conditions of fair dialogue in particular, clearly emerge from a specific perspective. They are not objective reflections of the human condition, nor are they
universal values shared across all cultures or even within modem Western cul-

ture. As a result, they cannot stand as absolute rules but must remain open to
revision within the process of intercultural dialogue itself. However, they pro-

vide a provisional starting point for distinguishing fair but critical intercultural dialogue from ignorant accusations or the exercise of power.

II. Intercultural Understanding and Criticism:
Limitations and Possibilities

Even when openness and trust do exist among cultural groups, it is not clear
whether intercultural understanding is really possible. Can a member of a

11. This discussion is suggested in Georgia Warke, Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition,
and Reason (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987), 100-06.
12. These are derived from Jurgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative
Action, trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicolson (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press,

1990), 87-89, and Iris Marion Young, "Communication and the Other" in Democracy and Difference, ed., Seyla Benhabib (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 133-134.
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modern, western, industrial society really come to understand the cultural per-

spective of a Bororo tribesman. Or to take less exotic examples, can middleclass Euro-Americans always come to understand the perspectives of African
Americans or Native Americans, groups which, due partially to past and pres-

ent discrimination and oppression, have developed significantly distinct cul-

tural frameworks?13 These queries require us to examine the limitations of
intercultural understanding in order to understand how they alter the scope,
manner, and aims of intercultural criticism. Doing so requires clarifying both
the empirical and ontological limitations to intercultural understanding.
Empirical limitations reflect how constraints of opportunity, time, energy,
effort, and skill may limit one's capacity to understand another cultural per-

spective. Clearly, such limitations are encountered in intercultural political
life all the time, where the scarcity of time and resources constrains decisions

involving different cultural groups. These empirical limitations could be
overcome only by an unlimited communication community,'4 an ideal clearly
divorced from political reality. Nevertheless, it is important to examine the
extent to which different groups overcome these empirical limitations in order

to assess the extent to which they can validly engage in intercultural criticism.

Some groups may overcome these empirical limitations more than others.
Take, for example, a minority cultural group which constantly encounters the

majority culture through the news media, forms of mass entertainment, or
policies and laws enacted by majority rule. Should this be the case, then it is
possible (though not necessary) that the minority culture, to a greater extent
than the majority culture, will overcome the empirical limitations to intercul-

tural understanding and more validly engage in intercultural criticism.

While empirical limitations chasten the belief that intercultural understanding can develop quickly or easily, they do imply that cultural perspectives can be fully understood, given sufficient time, skill, and effort. More

daunting limitations emerge when we examine the ontological character of
cultural perspectives. On the most basic level, it is clear that most, if not all,
living cultures change over time. As a result, if one seeks to understand a new
culture within which one does not regularly participate, then one's understanding may become outdated or inaccurate. On a more complex level, the
content and even the boundaries of a culture may change as it encounters
other cultures. While critical intercultural dialogue provides one intentional
process whereby intercultural contact may lead to cultural change, other, less

13. In using these umbrella terms, I do not ignore important distinctions and differences that

exist among the individuals included within them. For purposes of this essay, however, I will use

these terms, except where more specific cultural groups, like the Pueblo, are discussed.

14. See Karl-Otto Apel, "Scientism or Transcendental Hermeneutics," in Towards a Transformation of Philosophy, trans. G. Adey and D. Frisby (London: Routledge, 1980).
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conscious processes can also be important. Interaction with European settlers

prompted many diverse Native American nations to develop a "supratribal
consciousness," which led them to discount cultural differences among themselves while emphasizing shared values that distinguished them from Europeans.5 Similarly, Americans of South Asian descent may emphasize distinct
religious or linguistic identities in their interactions with each other but then
emphasize shared social mores or culinary tastes in environments dominated
by Euro-Americans. In either case, individuals may give greater salience to
different cultural values or norms when placed in different cultural contexts.
These changes need not simply reflect strategic maneuvers to maintain distinctiveness or to protect group interests. Indeed, such changes may occur
unconsciously, beyond the intentions of the participants, and may be unrelated
to the pursuit of self-interest. Instead, changes to the salience of different cul-

tural values or experiences can be crucial for a cultural worldview to maintain

itself. How these changes complicate intercultural understanding should neither be underestimated nor dismissed.

Empirical and ontological limitations to intercultural understanding need
not completely preclude intercultural understanding: rather, they preclude
only complete intercultural understanding. Participants within intercultural
communication must acknowledge that a final and comprehensive understanding of another culture is unlikely, but partial, provisional understandings
remain possible. Thus, acknowledging the limitations to understanding need
not lead one uncritically to accept statements like, "You wouldn't understand
anyway." Rather, acknowledging these limitations should prompt participants
to enter intercultural dialogue expecting to learn something from the other,16

since any prior assumptions are only partial, finite, and incomplete. In this
way, recognizing the empirical and ontological limitations to intercultural

understanding reconfigures intercultural dialogue as part of an ongoing
process that can come to partial conclusions but can never reach a final resting point.

Acknowledging ontological and empirical limitations to understanding
clearly limits claims about the capacity for valid intercultural criticism, since
one can only criticize what one understands. However, these limitations need
not preclude intercultural criticism in its entirety: rather, they might require
that we transform its scope, manner, and aims. Intercultural criticism has often

been portrayed in a deductive manner. According to this approach, the critic
deduces from putatively objective or natural human characteristics certain
moral positions, which are in turn used to criticize specific cultural practices.
15. Stephen Corell, The Return of the Native: American Indian Political Resurgence.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 114-15.
16. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 293-94.
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As skepticism about such pure moral truths has grown, some liberal thinkers
have reformulated cultural criticism as neutral dialogue based upon those
beliefs, values, or concepts shared by the various cultural groups within a
society.'7 In this portrayal, the scope of cultural criticism is bounded by whatever beliefs members of different cultural groups already share.
One might reject this liberal portrait for its use of the term neutrality, its

specific articulation of the shared beliefs in question, or its demand that dialogue must be constrained to shared themes.18 However, one can reconfigure
the liberal model as a more contingent process, through which members of
different cultural groups reach partial understandings of their cultural perspectives and only then criticize either these partial understandings or the
practical conclusions drawn from them.'9 This more contingent portrait does
accurately depict how the limitations of intercultural understanding also limit
the scope of intercultural criticism.

Yet intercultural criticism need not remain so bounded in scope if we
transform its manner. Instead of depicting cultural criticism in deductive
terms, we might portray it through the model of questioning. From her analy-

sis of limitations to understanding, Young concludes that partners in dialogue

will probably end up engaging in questioning, since they do not fully under-

stand each other's perspectives.20 When portrayed in this way, questioning
remains part of the process of intercultural understanding. But coming to
know what one does not know should remind us of the wisdom of Socrates,
perhaps the best known questioner in Western philosophy. Although Socratic
questioning was, at least ostensibly, motivated by his admission of ignorance,
it also enabled criticism of the values and beliefs of his interlocutors, by drawing on their own answers and inconsistencies. Now, we need not affirm all

examples of Socratic questioning, which in some Platonic dialogues appears
motivated less by a desire to learn than by the will to impose a specific position upon a pliant audience. However, the aporetic dialogues, where neither
Socrates nor his interlocutor arrives at any firm conclusion about the topic in
question, suggest a more open-ended manner of criticism.

17. The standard models of constrained liberal dialogue are Bruce Ackerman, "Why Dialogue?" Journal of Philosophy 86 (January, 1989): 5-22; and John Rawls, "The Idea of an Over-

lapping Consensus," Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 7 (Spring, 1987): 1-25, and "The Priority
of the Right and Ideas of the Good," Philosophy and Public Affairs 17 (Fall, 1988): 251-76.
18. For a trenchant criticism of this formulation of public dialogue, see Seyla Benhabib, Sit-

uating the Self(New York: Routledge, 1992), 95-104.
19. To various degrees, what I call the more contingent approach to constrained liberal dialogue is presented by Charles Larmore, "Political Liberalism," Political Theory 18 (August
1990): 347-49 and J. Donald Moon, Constructing Community (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 99-100.
20. Young, "Asymmetrical Reciprocity," 355-57.
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When we adopt the open-ended manner of questioning, the aims of inter-

cultural criticism also change. The deductive model of intercultural criticism

brings substantive criticisms to bear on existing beliefs and practices: the
model of aporetic questioning achieves the more modest goal of prompting
participants to realize the contingency and finitude of their cultural worldviews. It also suggests that the recognition of such contingency will encourage individuals to reflect upon and question their own perspectives, opening
them to possible cultural changes through later intercultural dialogues. This
type of outcome is portrayed in Plato's Theatetus. Here, despite the failure to
reach any final conclusion regarding the meaning of knowledge [episteme],
Socrates nevertheless hopes to achieve a practical goal. By pointing out the
limits of Theatetus' knowledge, Socrates believes that the brilliant youth may
become more gentle with his own intellectual comrades.2' Similarly, when we
portray intercultural criticism as open-ended questioning, the aim of criticism

shifts: participants seek only to encourage each other to experience their cultural worldviews as contingent and open to revision.22 In this way, critical
questioning sets the stage for further dialogues, wherein the partial agreements which ground deductive intercultural criticism may be attained.

III. The Conditions of Critical Intercultural Dialogue
By thus altering its scope, manner, and aims, participants can continue to
practice intercultural criticism even while acknowledging empirical and ontological limitations to intercultural understanding. Even so, intercultural dia-

logue needs to be based on certain rules if it is to proceed under fair condi-

21. Plato, Theatetus, 210c. For an insightful account of how the aporetic character of certain

Socratic dialogues can contribute to toleration of different perspectives, see Gerald M. Mara,

"Socrates and Liberal Toleration," Political Theory 16 (August 1988): 468-95.
22. Although approached through a very different theoretical lens, this point seems to resonate with Jurgen Habermas's assertion that a discursive normative framework demands a "post-

conventional morality," where one's norms and beliefs are held as hypothetical and open to revision. Habermas uses this notion show how discourse is incompatible with fundamentalist cultures

that close off their religious or metaphysical worldviews from critical scrutiny. See Habermas,

Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber

Nicholson (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1990), 87; Between Facts and Norms, trans.
William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996), 371; and StephLt K. White, The Recent

Work of Jurgen Habermas (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 57-58. As is well
known, Habermas tries to arrive at this point through a defense of the normative content and com-

municative rationality of the modem ways of thinking. While an analysis of Habermas's position
is impossible here, my main concern is that it frees moder cultures from recognizing their own
contingency and the possibility that they may have something to learn from cultures which, at
least in some ways, might not be considered moder. If this is the case, then Habermas's moder
culture is not satisfying the criterion of openness necessary for critical intercultural dialogue.
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tions. Earlier, I provisionally suggested two sets of rules: one precluding the
exercise of power, and the other precluding thematic constraints. Powernegating rules at minimum require participants to abstain from exercising

social power, the capacity to manipulate the words or actions of others
through the use or threat of force. Because social power is often facilitated by

access to material or financial resources, measures to overcome significant
material inequality may be needed to ensure the fair and equal participation of

economically and politically marginalized cultural groups.2 Rules proscribing
thematic constraints at minimum prohibit groups from taking certain topics
off the agenda prior to securing the agreement of others. These two sets of
rules do not only facilitate but are partially constitutive of intercultural dialogue: without such minimum conditions of fairness, the dialogical process of
coming to understand and then criticizing another culture would be impossible. Yet these rules are provisional and open to revision within the process of
dialogue. Thus, we must both examine how rules can be disputed and revised
and evaluate the specific rules proposed here.
To dispute the specific conditions of fairness need not close off intercultural dialogue. As many writers have noted, dialogue can be portrayed as a
loosely organized game "where there is no umpire to definitively interpret the
rules of the game and their application."24 As a result, dialogue can continue,
even if the rules are challenged or disputed, so long as the players can agree
to new rules and applications. However, two issues remain crucial. First, all
participants must equally accept these rules: nobody can impose rules upon
others, be they linguistic experts, social theorists, or members of the dominant

culture. As Gadamer puts it, linguistic dialogue "is the game which we all play

together. None plays before the other; each is in the midst of the game."25
Second, all participants must remain committed to playing the game of inter-

cultural dialogue. This commitment can be reinforced through the process of

dialogue itself, for example when critical questioning encourages groups to
view their perspectives as provisional and revisable, or when actors formulate

solutions to common problems.
The possibility of revising the rules of dialogue suggests that we evaluate
the specific rules proposed here. For instance, a liberal critic might find three
faults with the preclusion of thematic constraints: they hinder efficient deci-

sion making; they contradict liberal toleration, since many groups simply
wish to pursue their cultural ends without interference; and they may promote

inter-group conflict by highlighting controversial topics. These criticisms are

23. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 150 and 175.
24. Benhabib, Situating the Self, 107.
25. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, trans. David E. Linge (Berkeley,
CA: The University of California Press, 1976), 32.
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cogent but tell only half the story, since they overlook the importance of how

topics are taken off the agenda. If all groups agree to exclude a controversial
topic from further discussion, whether to move on to more pressing concerns,

to respect a group's specific practices, or to avoid conflict, then there has been

no violation of the rules precluding thematic constraints.26 If, however, one
group refuses to entertain a controversial topic which another group intensely

wishes to address, then fair dialogue is not possible.7 Indeed, the very idea of

critical intercultural dialogue suggests that controversial topics must be
raised, since criticism usually involves a topic that is controversial to at least
one group. Admittedly, controversial contributions will not immediately gain
many adherents among members of other cultures. In order to gain broader
acceptance, initially controversial contributions will have to emphasize their
similarities to other concepts already accepted. Yet it is possible that initially
controversial cultural viewpoints may eventually gain the assent or at least the
respect of others, and this possibility remains only if intercultural dialogue is

thematically unconstrained.
From a very different angle, Young criticizes the focus on negating social

power, since this overlooks how the use of some modes of speaking, like
argumentative Habermasian discourse, may embody a form of cultural power
that silences women and some minorities.28 Young clearly raises an important
point. Arguments are won not simply by the force of the better argument but

also by the force with which one argues. At minimum, valid points can be
overlooked simply because they are tentatively raised. At maximum, some
individuals will be cowed into silence or false agreement simply because they
are intimidated by argumentative speech. As a result, we must inquire how
actors can counter cultural power without constraining dialogue in other ways.
To do so, one might adopt rules proscribing argumentative speech within
intercultural dialogue. This solution falters on two grounds. First, it may func-

tion almost like a thematic constraint, since it is probably impossible to make
a clear distinction between the content of speech and its mode of conveyance.

Sometimes, one's true meaning can only be conveyed in a specific way.
Second, argumentative speech is often necessary in order to criticize morally
suspect cultural practices. As a result, a blanket condemnation of argumentation within intercultural dialogue is probably misguided. A different but
equally problematic response suggests that participants adopt putatively more

26. Simone Chambers, "Discourse and Democratic Practices," in The Cambridge Companion to Habermas, ed. Stephen K. White (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 240.
27. Seyla Benhabib notes that many marginalized groups, like women and cultural or ethnic
minorities, have been able to have their perspectives heard only by making controversial claims,
statements, and questions. Situating the Self, 154.

28. Young, "Communication and the Other," 133-34.
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inclusive modes of speech, such as greeting, storytelling, rhetoric,29 and testi-

mony.30 However, it is not always apparent how culturally marginalized
groups will benefit from these other modes. Greetings may be hollow formal-

ities, stories can be told that disparage disadvantaged groups, rhetoric can be
used to manipulate pliant audiences, and the credibility of testimony is clearly

linked to the status of the witness. Indeed, argumentation may prove indis-

pensable in testing the content of propositions introduced through other
modes of speech.
Ultimately, the very real danger posed by cultural power must be countered

by the willingness of actors to listen receptively to each other, in order to
understand other perspectives before criticizing them. Such receptive listening
assumes that participants believe that they have something to learn from each
other, which in turn presupposes the openness and trust that enable intercultural dialogue in the first place. This presupposition is not unrealistic. Although

the spirit of openness is not always present, resolute intransigence toward
intercultural dialogue tends to occur only in extreme cases. Even usually reclusive groups like the Pueblo have adopted openness and trust within forums for
intercultural dialogue. Moreover, openness and receptivity can be motivated
not only by moral altruism but also by at least four potential advantages.
First, it offers marginalized groups the opportunity to have their perspectives heard directly, not through the projections and representations of the dom-

inant culture's news and entertainment media. Second, intercultural learning
can benefit all groups involved. For instance, Euro-Americans are increasingly

turning to Native models of mediation to bypass the costs of adversarial dis-

pute settlements common in litigation. Conversely, some commentators
believe that the introduction of certain Anglo-American judicial procedures
can assist Native institutions, like tribal courts, as they deal with the increased
complexity of their jurisdictional duties.3' Third, under circumstances of cultural conflict, the costs of engaging in critical intercultural dialogue can be
offset by increased voluntary compliance, since solutions generated by agreement tend to enjoy greater legitimacy than those imposed by outside forces.32
Finally, one cost of engaging in critical intercultural dialogue-the risk that
one's cultural values will be criticized or condemned-can also be an advan-

tage. While the pain of receiving criticism or the shaking of one's worldview
should not be underestimated, the potential for criticism can also be interpreted

as a sign of respect. Uncritical acceptance of worldviews, regardless of content, is patronizing both in its failure to take other cultures seriously and in its

29.
30.
31.
32.

Young, "Communication and the Other," 128-33.
Lynn Sanders, "Against Deliberation," Political Theory 25 (June 1977): 347-76.
Deloria and Lytle, American Indians, American Justice, 203.
John Dryzek, Discursive Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 55.
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presumption that others cannot revise their perspectives.33

Still, we must acknowledge that the advantages of openness are potential,
not guaranteed. When groups fail to adopt the attitude of openness necessary
for critical intercultural dialogue, then we may have to watch as other cultures
commit acts which appear unjust, taking care to protect ourselves from appar-

ent injustices. In these situations, the commitment to dialogue is superseded
by a strategic attempt to secure a prudential modus vivendi.34 But even within

a modus vivendi, residual duties still apply to adherents of critical intercul-

tural dialogue. At minimum, they must retain a stance of openness. This
entails the willingness to try to understand other cultures and to hold their own

values as open to revision. In the absence of actual intercultural dialogue,
however, this does not require blindly affirming morally suspect cultural prac-

tices. Furthermore, given the tight relationship between openness and trust,

they should investigate whether a group's present lack of openness results
from past interactions that have undermined trust. Should this be the case,
then unilateral measures may be required to generate intercultural trust.
Finally, because power relations contradict the fair conditions for critical
intercultural dialogue, groups may bear asymmetrical residual duties within a
modus vivendi. Just as asymmetrical capacities to overcome the empirical

limitations to understanding give groups asymmetrical opportunities to
engage in intercultural criticism, so too does the asymmetrical possession of
power provide asymmetrical duties to remain open and to generate trust. In
this way, critical intercultural dialogue, even when it confronts its most diffi-

cult limits, nevertheless prescribes substantial normative duties.

IV. Illuminating Critical Intercultural Dialogue
While critical intercultural dialogue extends normative weight even at its
limits, its primary focus is to foster fair criticism within actual intercultural

dialogues. To illuminate this, I turn here to issues of cultural value conflict
between Native American and other American communities. My goal is not to
resolve such conflicts, since a dialogical approach leaves resolution to the participants themselves. Instead, I use the framework of critical intercultural dia-

33. Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," in Multiculturalism and the Politics of
Recognition, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 62-73.

34. I emphasize that this would be a modus vivendi and not what Young calls "a stance of
respectful distance" in "Asymmetrical Reciprocity," 345 and 358. The latter results when groups
confront the limitations to understanding or agree to disagree only after engaging in fair and crit-

ical intercultural dialogue. When groups refuse attempts to engage in dialogue, especially in situations of cultural value conflict, then respect falls away and only distance remains. For this distance has not been traversed by the dialogical understanding and criticism that might determine
whether or not respect was warranted.
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logue to evaluate the extent to which actors involved in intercultural value
conflicts achieve the criteria of understanding prior to criticism, fair conditions, and an attitude of openness and trust.
Understanding Prior to Criticism
Although it is almost a truism that one can only validly criticize practices and
beliefs that one truly understands, the achievement of understanding prior to
criticism confronts difficult empirical and ontological limitations in practice.
Empirical limitations often reflect asymmetries in the frequency and depths of

contact among different cultures. Such asymmetry exists among many Native

Americans and non-Native American individuals. Through the electronic and
print media, formal education, migration from reservations to cities, and inter-

actions with federal courts and bureaucracies, many Native individuals
directly encounter aspects of many non-Native cultures. Conversely, most
non-Native individuals encounter Native cultures only briefly, infrequently, or
through movies, television shows, and advertisements. This empirical asymmetry may enable Native individuals to gain a better understanding of nonNative cultures than vice-versa. For example, many Native individuals have
developed considerable understandings of political concepts like limited government, consent of the governed, and territorial jurisdiction. Many nonNative individuals, including lawyers and political theorists, might agree with
these understandings. As a result, Native individuals can use these partial
understandings to criticize actual federal policies that contradict them. For
instance, contrary to the idea of full territorial jurisdiction, tribal courts generally cannot hear criminal cases and cannot try non-Natives who commit
crimes on tribal territory.35 Furthermore, in contrast to ideas of limited government and consent of the governed, the U. S. Congress can use federal plenary power to abrogate treaties and impose federal laws upon Native peoples
without their consent.36 Native leaders have criticized both of these policies as
contrary to political concepts that the broader American community purportedly holds dear.37 The framework of critical intercultural dialogue would support them in doing so.

35. This would be like a New Jersey court being unable to try a New Yorker who crossed
the Hudson River to commit a crime. See Deloria and Lytle, American Indians, American Justice,
178-82.

36. Congressional plenary power over Native peoples is an extra-constitutional power
formed by the Supreme Court in United States v. Kagama and Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock. See David
E. Wilkins, "Transformations of Supreme Court Thought," The Social Science Journal, 30: 194197.

37. As one non-Native writer puts it, "In a constitutional republic premised on the authority
of limited sovereigns and the consent of the governed, federal doctrines of plenary power and uni-
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Conversely, most non-Native individuals neither possess nor act upon
opportunities to understand Native cultures. Thus, the extent to which they

may validly criticize Native practices may be restricted. Take the case of
Thomas v. Norris, where the Canadian Supreme Court held that the involuntary character of the Spirit Dance was not an intrinsic part of Salish culture
and thus ruled that the punishment of non-participants was unconstitutional.38

Admittedly, my limited understanding of Salish culture prevents me from
rejecting this conclusion outright. However, the criterion of understanding
prior to criticism forces us to inquire whether the Canadian Supreme Courta body dominated by European Canadians-was able to reach partial agreements with the Salish about the central components of their culture. If not,
then it cannot justify its decision on cultural grounds.
The problem of ontological limitations to intercultural understanding is

illustrated by examining the issue of patrilineal succession. This practice
grants tribal membership to the children of men who marry outside the tribe
but not to the children of women who do so. While non-Native individuals

cannot validly criticize this practice unless they gain a sufficient understanding of the cultural worldview that animates it, certain circumstances may justify greater outside criticism. First, many female members of tribes that prac-

tice patrilineal succession do criticize this practice. Moreover, historical and
anthropological evidence suggests that, prior to the European migration to
North America, matrilineal succession was the norm among several tribes that
presently practice patrilineal succession. The British clearly introduced patrilineal succession to Native peoples in Canada through the Indian Act, while

in pre-colonial times the Santa Clara Pueblo practiced matrilineal succession.39 However, such historical evidence is an insufficient basis for rejecting

patrilineal succession. For instance, the Santa Clara Pueblo adopted patrilineal succession through its own governing structures, after it regained tribal
sovereignty.40 Thus, individuals outside of the Santa Clara Pueblo cannot
immediately suggest that the patrilineal ordinance contradicts authentic cultural practices, since this would overlook the ontological fact that cultures can

lateral abrogation of tribal authority are clearly extra constitutional and ought to be considered

beyond the scope of national authority." Frank Pommersheim, Braid of Feathers: American
Indian Law and Contemporary Tribal Life (Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press,
1995), 120.
38. Tully cites this case as an instance where intercultural accommodation need not overlook the demands of individuals, Strange Multiplicity, 172.

39. Tully, Strange Multiplicity, 193 and Michael McDonald, "Indian Status: Colonialism or
Sexism?" Canadian Community Law Journal 9 (Annual 1986): 27 for Canadian Native peoples.
Deloria and Lytle, American Indians, American Justice, 133 on the Santa Clara Pueblo.
40. Deloria and Lytle, American Indians, American Justice, 133.
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change over time. But the ambiguity of cultural history and the presence of
internal dissent does justify further critical questioning.

Critical questioning is of crucial importance in the midst of empirical and
ontological limitations to intercultural understanding. Where partial agreements about different cultural perspectives do not exist, non-Native peoples
are not completely precluded from criticizing Native practices: rather, they
should adopt critical questioning with a genuinely open stance, whereby the
questioner does not assume the role of the police interrogator but asks questions aimed at learning the other perspective. In doing so, the questioner
should ask for clarification of unclear ideas or beliefs, acknowledge areas of
misunderstanding and disagreement, and remain persistent, particularly where
misunderstanding or disagreement remains.
Fair Conditions

Whether adopting the form of critical questioning or deductive analysis from
partial inter-cultural agreements, intercultural criticism remains valid only to
the extent that it occurs under fair conditions. Since fair conditions are in part
meant to counter the asymmetrical power relations which exist between the

Native and non-Native communities, arenas of intercultural dialogue should
be protected from the effects of this inequality. Yet broader social conditions

may render this difficult. Many Native peoples suffer relative deprivation
regarding not only material resources but also education, health care, and

maybe even psychological well-being.4' These deprivations may in turn
diminish their very capacity to engage in intercultural dialogue. Hence,
merely insulating the forum of intercultural dialogue from the influence of
money and direct coercion may fail to produce fair conditions. To rectify this

situation, efforts to improve conditions within Native communities should
precede critical intercultural dialogue. Indeed, such measures may be necessary to generate the trust and openness upon which critical intercultural dialogue depends.
The following dialogue illustrates the distorting effects of forms of social
and cultural power. Here, Domingo Montoya, Chairman of the All-Indian
Pueblo Council, and Paul Woodard, the Senate Counsel, engage each other in

a 1969 Senate hearing in Albequerque concerning possible changes to the
1968 Indian Civil Rights Act. Montoya worried that the act's Equal Protection
Clause would require the immediate and chaotic replacement of Pueblo forms
of consensual leadership selection with American-style competitive elections.

1. Woodward. Do you think in the other pueblos, if you were to establish a
41. See Berger, A Long and Terrible Shadow, 37-38.

This content downloaded from 134.82.68.137 on Wed, 07 Sep 2016 16:38:09 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Michael Rabinder James 603

system... of competitive elections, that there would be opposition to the candidates recommended by the elders?

Montoya. Yes, I do. I think that they would-the reason for this would be
because of the low level of education at this time. I think they still would want
to live the way they are living, have livedfor centuries, and still want to go on

with their present system. I know that in time as the people obtain an educa-

tion they will demand a change.

2. W. In other words, you don't think they should be permitted, because of
this low level of education right at the moment, to choose their own leaders?
M. That is one important reason.
3. W. Do you think, then, that the leaders chosen by the elders do not enjoy
general support among the pueblos?
M. No, I think they do.
4. W. You think that they would be supported by a majority of the people in
the pueblos?
M. Yes.

5. W. Then, presumably they could be elected even if you had an election in
which every member of the pueblo participated and in which candidates were
recommended by the elders for governor and members of the council?
M. What is the question?

6. W. What would be wrong with that, then? In other words, what I am getting at is why elections would result in dissension and chaos as you indicated?

M. I am talking about the old system. You are trying to ...
7. W. I am talking about the new system. Under the new system that would
be imposed, although I am not entirely clear that the act would require ...
M. If the act changed, certainly they would be elected if they got on the right
side of the people.

8. W. Then what would be wrong with that?
M. Really, there would be nothing wrong with it except that the people would
have to want them and would have to vote for them.

9. W. Under the Indian Rights Act [sic], that's exactly the case ...
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M. Yes.

10. W (continuing). People would have to want them.
M. Yes, sir.
11. W. If, as you indicate, the candidates recommended got the widespread
support in the pueblos, they would be elected and I don't see why there would
be dissension and chaos.

M. Well, it would be. Very hard to understand.42

A substantial amount of misunderstanding seems to arise within this dia-

logue. Montoya, in his first response, seems to misunderstand the question
and apparently responds that there would be popular opposition to the introduction of competitive elections, not to the candidates recommended by the
elders, as Woodward states. In the fifth and sixth questions, Montoya respectively asks what the question is and appears confused about which system is
being discussed. The breadth of misunderstanding became clearer when, following this dialogue, Thomas Olson, the Euro-American counsel for the AllIndian Pueblo Council, clarified Montoya's concerns. He noted that in several
Pueblos, less than five percent of the population was registered to vote, since
voting in competitive elections had not been a part of their lives. While several civic groups had been working to register Pueblo voters and introduce
them to the American political system, the work is still at an early stage.
Hence, he tentatively concluded that the immediate introduction of competitive elections would likely diminish the people's confidence in both their own
leaders and the federal government.43 These misgivings, while not necessarily

conclusive, could plausibly be accepted by individuals outside the Pueblo
community, since they raise concerns regarding new political institutions that

have been voiced in a variety of cultural and political contexts."
The causes of the above misunderstandings are probably multifarious. The
participants hold asymmetrical social power. Though this hearing was somewhat insulated from the effects of social power, since participants could not
use force, threats, or bribes to manipulate the positions of the other, it still is

part of the deliberations of the U. S. Senate. That body does enjoy the congressional plenary power unilaterally to alter the political structure of the
Pueblos, who of course lack the power to reciprocate. Indeed, at the time of
this hearing, the Indian Civil Rights Act had already been passed, and the participants were discussing only whether to modify some of its provisions. As a

42. Amendments to the Indian Bill of Rights, 10-11. Emphases added.
43. Amendments to the Indian Bill of Rights, 11-12.

44. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 167.
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result, Montoya and the Pueblo are in the weaker position.
Furthermore, the dialogue also suggests that Woodward's adversarial style
exerted a certain amount of cultural power over Montoya. Montoya was often

confused by Woodward's questions, and his ultimate acquiescence seems to
reflect frustration at being misunderstood more than any rational conviction
through the force of the better argument. Addressing the problem of cultural

power need not require a complete prohibition of argumentative dialogue,
since doing so might entail a dangerous thematic constraint. Moreover, argumentation may provide substantial benefits. At minimum, it can help test the
validity of the claims that the participants offer. More broadly, argumentation
can help expose power relations which representative participants might hold
over their constituents. Montoya claims to speak for the Pueblo, but his position might result from questionable political power relations internal to the
community. However, Woodward's use of argumentation exposes neither the
indefensibility of Montoya's concerns nor the presence of internal power relations. Argumentative speech is probably indispensable for critical intercultural dialogue, but criticism is valid only after achieving understanding. So if
immediately assuming an argumentative stance hinders intercultural understanding, it should initially be avoided.
Openness and Trust
The difficulty of countering cultural power without thematically constraining
dialogue reminds us that an attitude of openness and trust remains crucial for

the practice of critical intercultural dialogue. The possibility that participants

will adopt openness at least partially depends upon the potential advantages
enabled by this attitude. One advantage is the possibility of voluntary compliance with new institutions that are not forced upon unwilling groups.
Indeed, Montoya notes that some Pueblos have adopted modified, Americanstyle political institutions "of their own free will, under the terms of the Indian

Reorganization Act of 1934."45 While the Congressional enactment of this
policy did not fully satisfy the criteria of critical intercultural dialogue, its
provisions for voluntary compliance suggest that this advantage is not merely
speculative.
Moreover, different forums can also foster or inhibit an attitude of open-

ness. Senate hearings probably hinder openness within intercultural dialogue,
since federal plenary power places Native and governmental officials within

an asymmetrical power relation that casts a shadow even upon insulated
arenas. More generally, empirical analysis suggests that decision-making settings tend to discourage participants from adopting the attitude of openness

45. Amendments to the Indian Bill of Rights, 9.
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necessary for critical intercultural dialogue.46 This need not suggest that fair

critical intercultural dialogue is impossible within such settings, but it does
imply that we must identify other, more favorable arenas. Venues that lack
decision-making powers may be more promising.
Frank Pommersheim suggests that Native and non-Native representatives
sit on commissions that examine tribal-state relations and advise citizens and

legislators through publications. These commissions could address not only
strong value conflicts but also issues, like resource development, that indirectly

engage value conflicts over conceptions of property and human relationships
with nature.47 Intercultural professional organizations may be another promis-

ing setting. Game management, tax collection, law enforcement, and jurisprudence confront Native and non-Native practitioners with common problems

caused by overlapping jurisdictional boundaries. These problems would
remain even if tribal courts are granted full territorial jurisdiction, since reser-

vations often cross state borders.48 While such organizations could clearly aid
in training and education, their greatest contribution might be to encourage
Native and non-Native participants "to appreciate one another as people who
share similar job challenges, rewards, and frustrations."49 Thus, they might
assist critical intercultural dialogue less through the criticism of specific practices than by gradually developing trust and openness.
Finally, critical intercultural dialogue can be fostered by mediation, where
a third party helps participants resolve conflicts themselves. Unlike binding
arbitration or legal adjudication, mediation does not grant the third party deci-

sion-making powers. Instead, the mediator tries to build trust among partici-

pants, encourages them to hold their perspectives as revisable, and suggests
mutually advantageous solutions. This lack of decision-making power differentiates mediation from the juridical model of dispute settlement. Indeed, one
sign of successful mediation is the increasingly inactive role of the third party,

an element that reveals its "discursive design."5 Mediation may be particularly attractive for cases involving Native groups, many of whom traditionally

resolved disputes through elders who did not pronounce verdicts but tried to
"create an atmosphere" for participants to "discuss the problem until a satisfactory ... solution could be agreed upon."5'

46. Chambers, "Discourse and Democratic Practices," 255.
47. Pommersheim, Braid of Feathers, 154, 160.
Deloria and Lytle, American Indians, American Justice, 187-88.
Pommersheim, Braid of Feathers, 158-59.
Dryzek, Discursive Democracy, 44-46.
Deloria and Lytle, American Indians, American Justice, 112.

48.
49.
50.
51.
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V. Conclusion

These institutional suggestions should not be mistaken for substantive
answers to specific intercultural value conflicts. Indeed, the history of Native

and non-Native political interactions suggest that there "are no 'answers,' and
the imposition of 'answers' in the past-answers such as cultural assimilation,
religious conversion, and the concept of individual property-resulted in sub-

stantial cultural loss and the severe erosion of political and personal autonomy."52 This aporia reflects the fact that these "answers" were supported not

only by those selfishly seeking to exploit disadvantaged peoples but also by
allies who viewed Native forms of land holding, religious worship, and communal living as obstacles to their advancement.3 With this in mind, critical
intercultural dialogue avoids well-intentioned answers and seeks only to clarify how actors themselves can mitigate intercultural conflicts.
Importantly, this means facing the conflict, not avoiding it. When the prac-

tices of one culture seem to contradict values cherished by another, critical
intercultural dialogue proposes neither imposing answers nor looking the
other way. Rather, it encourages members of conflicting cultures to adopt an
attitude of openness toward each other, to attempt to understand each other's
perspectives, and only then to engage in intercultural criticism. In advocating

this stance, critical intercultural dialogue also encourages participants to recognize honestly the limitations confronting intercultural understanding, how
these limitations alter the scope, manner, and aims of intercultural criticism,

and what conditions enable intercultural dialogue to proceed fairly. Thus, a
theory of critical intercultural dialogue cannot propose answers to specific
cultural conflicts. Instead, it encourages participants to explore the questions
carefully and persistently, in order to discover answers that better accommodate their diverse cultural perspectives.

52. Pommersheim, Braid of Feathers, 12.
53. See Berger, A Long and Terrible Shadow, 102.
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